The Crisis of Liberalism
When NAFTA came into effect in 1994, the final nail in the coffin of Midwestern manufacturing was hammered in. However, the act also represented a substantial blow to the strength of liberalism in the United States. Noble in aim, and ostensibly good for the everyday American through cheaper imports, NAFTA almost undeniably marked the end of large-scale industrialized manufacturing in the Midwest, with the Economic Policy Institute estimating a resulting net loss of 879,280 jobs in the following decade. Yet, President Clinton and his supporters wholeheartedly embraced the deal, focusing on the image of a wealthier, industrialized Mexico all the while feigning ignorance of the poor wages and working conditions that most workers were subjected to. Domestically, liberalism neglected the Midwestern working class, trading away union-negotiated wages and stable jobs for trade liberalization and lower-priced consumer goods.
The crisis of modern liberalism is rooted in this betrayal. The post-Clinton era has seen materialist perspectives vacate liberal discourse, resulting in an obsessive fixation on social issues while lacking a strong economic framework that would enable the construction of stronger political coalitions or a more rigorous analysis of systemic causes.
The irony of the Clinton-era program was that, while it was fundamentally economic, it surrendered itself to the ideas of Reaganomics and trickle-down economics over the objections of industry in the 90s. The Clinton administration actively pursued a policy of trade liberalization, seeking to reduce protections afforded to the American manufacturing industry, which had enabled it to compete against a cheaper import market where lower overseas labor costs would otherwise undercut it. This left hundreds of thousands of workers out of work, killing off large sections of the only industry in which their skill-set was employable. Democrats coupled this with welfare reform that forced routine recipients into the workforce, with a disproportionate impact on uneducated single mothers and women of color. Both of these groups subsequently entered the low-skilled labor pool, thus bidding down wages within a market already lacking strong unionization. In the end, Clinton-era economic policies served the interests of white-collar workers by reducing inflationary pressure while keeping their wages at their existing levels, leading to a relative increase in their purchasing power and therefore standards of living
This served to create a more electorally successful brand of liberalism that accommodated wealthier interests at the expense of Midwestern living standards. By formulating public policy in such a way that satisfies the desires of an increasingly small demographic of the upper-middle class, liberalism plants the seeds of its own demise by alienating society’s worst-off, who then turn to increasingly radical alternatives.
The shift in voting trends in the Midwest provides one example of this, with the suburban/urban elite forming the most reliable aspect of the liberal voting bloc in the 2016 and 2020 elections. Michigan, the state with the closest margin of the Midwestern states that swung red in 2016, demonstrates this clearly. While the whole state has shifted red in almost every county since the 1996 election, as shown below, the largest swings have been in the poorest counties.
Similarly, Wheeler County, Georgia, with the lowest per-capita income within the US voted for Bill Clinton to the tune of 55.34%. However, in every subsequent election, it increasingly has shifted to the GOP, even before Trump – though he won the county with 67.60% and 69.28% of the vote in 2016 and 2020 respectively. The liberal narrative of Trumpism being a spontaneous aberration from normality that will evaporate once defeated resoundingly rings false when we look at the voting patterns over time.
Instead, the white working class’s rejection of modern liberalism has been a gradual process marked by frustration and alienation from the political system, with Trump as the supposed culmination of this – or, as I would hazard to guess, the penultimate paving stone to something more dangerously radical. It is for this reason that I watch from the comfortable Australian coast with some trepidation as a new administration rolls into D.C. For, if liberalism does not reapply a materialist lens to its policy calculations, we could very well see the rise of another right-wing populist who occupies the same political space that Trump left behind him.
American leftists seem to have observed this phenomenon and are attempting to reintegrate intersectional class perspectives into liberal discourse. However, the consistent shutting out of true left-wing views by the Democratic party establishment seems to indicate an unwillingness to acknowledge the challenges facing them. Ultimately, if liberalism does not confront this crisis, it will continue to decline into an ineffective political tent that spits out compromise candidates the center-right and left share to prevent right-wing populism.